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ABSTRACT. The authors develop a simple analytical framework to study the welfare-
maximizing environmental standards when market entry is endogenous and firms can
circumvent regulation by bribing corrupt officials. Corruption changes the tradeoff in
environmental policy. Corruption leads more polluting firms to enter into the market,
which requires tighter environmental regulation. However, corruption also makes trad-
ing in some environmental protection for a marginally higher market entry optimal for
the government.
1. Introduction
The relationship between environmental regulation and emission is a fre-
quently debated topic among economics scholars. Most research addresses
perfectly enforceable policy measures, but some papers also consider that
firms have an incentive to circumvent the regulation, possibly with the
support of corrupt officials. This study addresses this aspect of envi-
ronmental policy, which should be highly relevant in many developing
countries. In many of these countries, fighting corruption is high on
the agenda. Despite significant efforts, curbing corruption is a long and
tedious process. Even with a successful anti-corruption policy, the lev-
els of corruption will often remain far above those levels of benchmark
countries such as Denmark or Norway. Several influential studies (e.g.,
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Koyuncu and Yilmaz, 2009 or Oliva, 2015) have demonstrated that cor-
ruption is used to circumvent environmental regulation. This raises the
question of how second-best policies should be designed that account
for the current extent of corruption. For instance, how must environmen-
tal policy be adjusted when some firms can circumvent regulations with
the help of corrupt officials? In particular, we examine the tradeoffs for
a welfare-maximizing government that wants to set environmental stan-
dards but is hampered by corrupt officials who allow firms to emit beyond
the permissible levels when they are paid a bribe.
We consider an industry where the production of goods causes envi-
ronmental pollution, e.g., by emitting hazardous vapors in the air or by
discharging poisonous liquids into the water. The government wants to
curb the amount of pollution by regulating the maximum allowable emis-
sion level. Any emission exceeding the permissible level must be abated,
and the producing firms must bear the cost. The permissible level of
emission is determined endogenously by maximizing the level of welfare
that incorporates profits in the industry, the costs of abatement and the
environmental damages from pollution.
In a world with perfect monitoring and without corruption, a benevolent
government would set the environmental standard so that the marginal
environmental benefit from a tighter standard equaled the marginal fore-
gone profits of the firms. If monitoring is incomplete and if the bureaucracy,
which is supposed to monitor the firms’ abatement, is characterized by
corruption, then the establishment of environmental standards becomes
slightly more complicated. The environmental regulations offer firms an
incentive to circumvent the costly abatement by bribing corrupt officials.
Tighter regulations make conducting business legally more expensive,
increasing the incentives to pay bribes.
In contrast to previous studies on corruption in environmental agen-
cies, we not only consider a given set of firms but also allow for an
endogenous entry of firms. This entry effect is important. In a world
without corruption, the entry option allows the government to tighten
regulation. This will force the marginal firm to leave the market without
having to pay the higher abatement costs. Without the exit option, the
marginal firm must bear the higher cost. Thus, from the government’s
perspective, the marginal social cost of abatement is lower when non-
profitable firms can exit. However, with corruption, the effect of entry
on optimal regulation is ambiguous. Corruption allows some firms to
circumvent environmental regulation and therefore facilitates the market
entry of polluting firms. From an environmental perspective, the addi-
tional entry should lead to a tighter environmental regulation. From a
more comprehensive welfare perspective, corruption increases the costs
of environmental protection. Corruption drives a wedge between the pri-
vate and the social benefits of market entry. We show that the government
may find it optimal to exchange some environmental protection for a
marginally higher market entry if corruption is widespread. The model
also illustrates that strong distributional concern where the government
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discounts bribe incomes in its welfare measure, ceteris paribus, leads to
tighter regulation.
Our paper is closely related to three strands of the literature: (1) endoge-
nous standard setting under incomplete compliance; (2) environmental
policy and market entry; and (3) corruption.
First, we contribute to the literature on endogenous standard setting
under incomplete compliance. A body of the literature on environmental
regulation focuses on the incomplete compliance of firms. For instance,
Harford (1978) discusses how firms react to tighter environmental stan-
dards and higher Pigouvian taxes when enforcement is imperfect. A
comparable exercise for tradable discharge permits is conducted by Malik
(1990) and Van Egteren and Weber (1996). Keeler (1991) extends Malik’s
analysis to a comparison of tradable permits and standards when regula-
tory authorities cannot enforce full compliance. Malik (2002) demonstrates
that some non-compliance may even be socially optimal as it can par-
tially offset the distortions caused by market power in the market for
tradable permits. In these papers, the environmental policy of the govern-
ment is exogenous in the sense that the government does not strategically
adjust the environmental policy to potential non-compliant behavior. Some
(more recent) studies, therefore, endogenize environmental policy and
attempt to provide guidance to a policy maker who must design mon-
itoring and enforcement policies. Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) analyze
the optimal allocation of resources on monitoring and enforcement in a
system of tradable permits with incomplete enforcement. The design of
optimal standards and penalties in a principal-agent framework is dis-
cussed by Arguedas (2008). Arguedas and Rousseau (2015) introduce a
hierarchical setting where national and local environmental agencies dif-
fer with respect to their objective functions and the available information
about the compliance costs of local firms. In our model, the central gov-
ernment sets a uniform emission standard, the local agencies are in charge
of enforcement, and the single firm decides on whether to comply with
the regulation. When setting the uniform emission standard, the govern-
ment takes into account the firms’ and the local agencies’ reaction to this
standard.1
Secondly, a key feature of our model of environmental regulation is the
market entry or exit of firms. A number of papers have addressed the ques-
tion of optimal Pigouvian taxes when market entry is endogenous and the
market equilibrium is determined in Cournot competition. The endogene-
ity of market entry may force the regulator to set a Pigouvian tax above
the marginal external damage (Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995). Lee
(1999) shows that this rule has to be modified when demand is non-linear.
Depending on the curvature of market demand, the pollution tax may
1 In another branch of the literature, the endogeneity of the regulation emerges
through negotiations between firms and regulators; see, for example, Amacher
and Malik (1996) or Arguedas (2005).
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be higher or lower than the marginal external damage. Instead of envi-
ronmental taxation, we focus on environmental standards as the tool for
the regulator.
The third relevant strand of literature concerns corruption in envi-
ronmental agencies or other monitoring bodies.2 When a firm tries to
circumvent environmental regulations, it faces the risk of detection and
subsequent punishment. If some of the monitoring officials are corrupt,
firms may choose to avoid punishment by paying a bribe. Both the com-
pliance behavior of the firm and the bribes of the official will react to
changes in environmental policy and thus make the implementation of an
optimal regulation more challenging. Few research papers have combined
enforcement and corruption in environmental regulation. Ivanova (2011)
distinguishes between actual and reported emissions when auditors are
corrupt. An increase in the effectiveness of auditing (or a reduction in cor-
ruption) reduces total emissions but has an ambiguous effect on reported
emissions. Her model also discusses the optimal Pigouvian tax rate of a
welfare-maximizing government, but the government’s tradeoff between
tax revenues, environmental damages and auditing costs is only briefly
addressed. Polinsky and Shavell (2001), who do not address environmental
policy specifically, distinguish between bribery and extortion. Corrupt offi-
cials are not only paid for their support in circumventing regulation but can
also threaten innocent people in order to extort money from them. Polinsky
and Shavell derive the optimal penalty structure for the different types of
corruption. Several empirical studies address the direct and indirect effects
of corruption on pollution (Welsch, 2004; Cole, 2007; Biswas et al., 2012).
Corruption can increase pollution directly by allowing firms to ignore regu-
lations or by forcing them into the unregulated shadow economy. However,
corruption may also have an indirect negative effect as it reduces overall
economic activity.3 Hubbard (1998) and Oliva (2015) study the licensing of
vehicle inspection centers and show that corruption significantly reduces
the effectiveness of vehicular emission controls. Deforestation as a con-
sequence of corruption is analyzed by Koyuncu and Yilmaz (2009) in a
cross-country study.
The studies most similar to our approach are Damania (2002) and
Stathopoulou and Varvarigos (2013). Damania analyzes the implications
of corruption for the design of a welfare-maximizing environmental policy.
His focus is primarily on the design of prosecution rates, monitoring and
fines; we, on the other hand, are interested in the interaction of regulation,
corruption and market entry. Stathopoulou and Varvarigos endogenize the
market entry of firms and stress that there are multiple equilibria where
pollution and corruption can be either high or low. In contrast to our
2 For a general survey on the economic analysis of corruption, see Aidt (2003). A
special issue of World Development (2006) covers important aspects of corruption
and development.
3 The detrimental effect of corruption on economic activity is at the heart of the
industrial organization view of corruption; see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) or Choi and Thum (2004, 2005).
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paper, they focus on the equilibrium outcome and do not consider the
welfare-maximizing policy choices of the government.
2. A simple model of corruption and environmental regulation
We employ a simple model to analyze the effect of corruption on opti-
mal environmental standards. Each firm in the market earns a revenue,
P , which is independent of the number of market entrants.4 To enter
the market, a firm must bear the fixed cost of entry, K . In the absence
of regulation, each firm would generate an emission level, ē. The gov-
ernment sets the environmental standards, which permit a maximum
emission level of e (e ≤ ē). Firms are supposed to abate the excessive
emissions, ē − e, which is costly. The costs are linear in abatement, and
firms differ in terms of the cost parameter. The abatement cost is denoted
by c · (ē − e). We assume that cost parameter c is uniformly distributed
on interval c ∈ [0, c̄]. Some firms can meet the government regulation at
almost no cost, whereas others will face high abatement costs. Because
all firms have the same revenue and the same cost of entry, the abate-
ment cost will ultimately drive their decisions as to whether to enter the
market.
In contrast to the firms, which are interested only in their profits, the gov-
ernment must also account for the environmental damages from pollution.
The government sets emission standard e to maximize society’s welfare.
Let E denote the total level of emissions, which is simply the sum of emis-
sions from all firms, and D(E) is the damage from pollution. We assume
that the damage is a convex function of emissions, E , i.e., D′, D′′ ≥ 0 and
D(0) = D′(0) = 0.
The regulatory decision is hampered by the fact that some of the bureau-
crats responsible for monitoring the firms’ abatement are dishonest.5 These
firms have the option to disregard the regulatory requirement in exchange
for a bribe, b. For firms with high abatement costs, bribing the corrupt offi-
cial will be more attractive than adjusting pollution levels. Corrupt officials
know the distribution of abatement costs but cannot observe the abatement
cost of the individual firm. Hence, the (representative) corrupt official must
4 If all firms operate in the same market, one might expect that the revenue per
firm will fall with the number of entrants. Because pollution results from many
production processes, the firms may very well come from different sectors. Hence,
the revenue can be independent of the number of firms in the market. The
interaction between corruption and competition is discussed, for example, by
Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and Emerson (2006).
5 We could also allow that some fraction of firms are not monitored at all. As
this feature does not affect the findings but facilitates the analysis, we make
the – somewhat unrealistic – assumption of complete monitoring. The degree
of monitoring would no longer be irrelevant with a different timing structure.
For instance, if the firms had to make the choice under uncertainty, not knowing
whether they would be monitored, we would have to introduce a punishment
scheme. If punishment can become infinite, no violation of regulations will occur.
We briefly discuss alternative timings of the game in section 3.
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Figure 1. Sequence of moves
establish a uniform bribe, b, that maximizes his own profit.6 The share of
corrupt officials is denoted by ρ.7
The game has four stages (see figure 1). In stage 1, the government
sets the allowable emission level. Then, the firms decide about market
entry (stage 2). In stage 3, the corrupt official sets the cost of the profit-
maximizing bribe. This sequence of moves reflects the long-term nature of
market entry. The corrupt official will be able to condition the bribe demand
on market entry, but he cannot make a credible commitment to a certain
bribe level before entry has occurred. In stage 4, firms that have encoun-
tered a corrupt official decide whether to pay the bribe or abate. All firms
meeting an honest official must comply with the environmental regulation
and incur the abatement costs. By the end, all payoffs are realized. As usual,
we solve the game using the backward induction method.
2.1. Abatement versus bribe
When a firm meets a corrupt official, it has a choice between paying the
bribe and abating. A profit-maximizing firm chooses the alternative with
the lowest costs. The cost of abatement is c · (ē − e), and the bribe amounts
to b. Therefore, the marginal firm that is indifferent about bribing or abating
has a cost parameter of
cAB = b
(ē − e) . (1)
6 For similar modeling approaches, see Shleifer and Vishny (1993) or Choi and
Thum (2004, 2005). In some cases, corrupt officials may be able to condition
their bribes on observable characteristics, as some empirical studies have demon-
strated (Svensson, 2003; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Olken and Barron, 2009).
For example, bribes demanded from truckers at military checkpoints in Indonesia
depend on truck characteristics and the average number of checkpoints along the
road (Olken and Barron, 2009). However, the soldiers cannot directly observe the
profitability of a single transport. We are specifically interested in this type of
incomplete information about unobservable characteristics because it generates
the distortion with regard to market entry. With perfect observability of abate-
ment costs, corrupt officials could extract the maximum willingness to pay from
all firms, and the entry decision would not be affected.
7 Corruption-fighting policies may reduce the share of corrupt officials. Because
there are always limits to what anti-corruption policies can achieve, the share of
corrupt officials will remain positive. Share ρ of corrupt officials can be seen as the
outcome of an optimal anti-corruption policy in a more complex setting. Because
the anti-corruption policy is designed on the macro level, it can hardly be tai-
lored to the specific needs in environmental regulation such as market entry in a
polluting industry.
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All firms with abatement costs c ∈ (0, cAB) will go for the abatement.
The bribe is preferred by firms with costs c ∈ (cAB , ĉ), where ĉ denotes the
highest abatement costs among all firms that have entered the market.
2.2. Profit-maximizing bribe
Each corrupt official is assigned to a random sample of firms. Therefore,
each corrupt official faces the same distribution of abatement costs as
the entire population of firms in the market. We assume that firms can-
not switch to another monitoring official. Thus, a corrupt official acts as
a monopolist when setting the profit-maximizing bribe. We analyze the
decision problem of a representative bureaucrat. The total bribe revenue
amounts to
B = b · ĉ − cAB
c̄
. (2)
1/c̄ is the density of abatement costs, and (ĉ − cAB)/c̄ is the proportion of
firms willing to pay bribe b. Using (1) and taking the derivative of the bribe
revenue with respect to b, we obtain the profit-maximizing bribe
b∗ = ĉ
2
(ē − e). (3)
Equations (1) and (3) imply that the marginal firm that is indifferent
between abating and bribing has a cost parameter of c∗AB = ĉ2 . Therefore,
among all firms entering the market, exactly half will abate, and the other
half of the same industry will not comply and will pay the bribe. This sim-
ple rule is due to our assumption of a uniform distribution. However, our
main point is independent of this specific assumption and also holds for a
general distribution of cost types: the endogenous choice of bribe payments
will always allow some firms to circumvent the environmental regulation.
2.3. Market entry
Now we turn to the firms’ entry decision. Before entering the market,
each firm knows that it will meet a corrupt bureaucrat with probability
ρ, the proportion of dishonest officials. When meeting a corrupt official,
a firm can choose between bribing and complying. It will choose what-
ever minimizes its cost. Therefore, the expected profit from market entry
amounts to
Eπ = P − K − [ρ · min [b∗, c (ē − e)] + (1 − ρ)c (ē − e)] . (4)
Solving for the marginal firm is slightly complicated by the fact that mar-
ket entry depends on the bribe, and the bribe depends on marginal firm
ĉ. According to the results from the previous section, marginal firm ĉ will
always prefer to pay the bribe. In equilibrium, the marginal firm with cost ĉ
anticipates future bribe b∗ and earns an expected profit of zero [Eπ(ĉ) = 0].
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Solving for ĉ yields
ĉ∗ = P − K(
1 − ρ2
) (
ē − e) . (5)
If market entry pays off for the marginal firm with cost ĉ∗, it will be
profitable for the infra-marginal firms c < ĉ∗ a fortiori.8 The equilibrium
bribe amounts to b∗ = (P−K )
(2−ρ) . All firms with abatement costs c ∈ [0, ĉ∗]
enter the market. When confronted with a corrupt official, those with costs
c ∈
[
0, ĉ
∗
2
]
prefer to abate; all other firms
(
c ∈
[
ĉ∗
2 , ĉ
∗
])
pay the bribe and
pollute.
The comparative statics with regard to the share of corrupt officials lead
to our first result.
Proposition 1. An increase in the share of corrupt officials: (a) induces more firms
to enter the market; (b) drives up the bribe rate; and, therefore, (c) increases the
number of abating firms.
Proof : Taking the derivatives with respect to the share of corrupt officials
ρ immediately yields ∂ ĉ
∗
∂ρ
= 2(P−K )
(ē−e)(2−ρ)2 > 0,
∂c∗AB
∂ρ
> 0 and ∂b
∗
∂ρ
= (P−K )
(2−ρ)2 > 0.

When the number of corrupt officials increases, this change facilitates
the market entry of high-cost firms. As the chances increase that they can
produce without any abatement by paying a bribe, market entry becomes
more attractive. This market-entry effect is straightforward. The change in
the bribe and the division into bribing and abating firms are less straight-
forward. The additional entry brings in firms that have high abatement
costs and, therefore, have a high willingness to pay for circumventing the
regulation. This makes it profitable for the corrupt official to increase the
bribe slightly. Those firms that were previously indifferent between brib-
ing and abating will now prefer to comply with the regulations. However,
the additional bribe revenue from the firms with a high willingness to pay
overcompensates the losses from those firms shifting to abatement.
Let us briefly note the effects of changes in the regulation on market entry
because this idea will be an important channel in the subsequent analy-
sis. The government determines the level of permissible emissions, e. An
increase in e implies a more lenient environmental regulation. Taking the
derivative of (5) with respect to e yields ∂ ĉ
∗
∂e = 2(P−K )(ē−e)2(2−ρ) > 0. Unsurpris-
ingly, a more lenient regulation lowers the firms’ costs and leads to more
8 The market-entry decision of the marginal firm also clarifies why we have intro-
duced sunk costs, K . For the marginal firm, the benefit of staying in the market
is P and the costs are ĉ∗(ē − e) = P−K
(1− ρ2 )
, once the entry costs are sunk. Hence, if
the marginal firm meets an honest official, it stays in the market if P ≥ P−K
(1− ρ2 )
or
K ≥ P · ρ2 . Without sunk costs of market entry, the marginal firm might prefer to
exit the market ex post.
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market entry. Due to two countervailing effects, the bribe is not affected
by changes in the regulation
(
∂b∗
∂e = 0
)
. On the one hand, a more lenient
regulation per se reduces the willingness to pay for circumventing the reg-
ulation (see equation (3)). On the other hand, however, the more lenient
regulation also brings in additional firms with high abatement costs, which
raises the bribe demand, ceteris paribus. As equations (3) and (5) show, these
two effects offset one another. Hence, the lower costs also induce some
firms to shift from bribing to abatement
(
∂c∗AB
∂e > 0
)
.9 Thus, a more lenient
regulation leads not only to more (polluting) firms in the market but also
to a shift towards cleaner production for some firms.
2.4. Environmental quality
Before turning to the welfare analysis, we will first discuss the effect of
corruption on environmental quality. Put differently, we ask how a govern-
ment that wants to achieve a certain environmental quality must adjust the
environmental regulation when corruption increases.
First, we calculate the total emissions for a given environmental regula-
tion. The emission level depends on the abatement cost. Firms whose costs
are given by c ∈ c(0, c∗AB) will comply with the governmental emission reg-
ulation and hence emit the permitted level of emissions, e. Share ρ of the
firms with cost structure c ∈ c(c∗AB , ĉ∗), however, will not comply, pay the
bribe and emit an amount of ē. Therefore, total emissions amount to
E = 1
c̄
· [c∗ABe + ρ (ĉ∗ − c∗AB) ē + (1 − ρ) (ĉ∗ − c∗AB) e] . (6)
Using (5), this can be simplified to
E = 1
c̄
· P − K
1 − ρ2
[
e
ē − e +
ρ
2
]
. (7)
An increase in the share of corrupt officials leads to higher emissions(
∂ E
∂ρ
> 0
)
for two reasons: first, a larger share of firms meets corrupt offi-
cials and can avoid any type of abatement; and secondly, the increase in
corruption makes the entry of polluting firms more attractive at the margin(
∂ ĉ∗
∂ρ
> 0
)
.
A government that wants to keep total emissions, E , constant must react
with tighter regulations when corruption increases. The total differentia-
tion of (7) yields
de
dρ
∣∣∣∣
E
= − ē − e
2 − ρ < 0. (8)
9 The neutrality of regulation with respect to the bribe rate is due to the linearity of
our approach. With a general distribution of abatement costs, the bribe rate would
also depend on environmental regulation. However, because it is impossible to
determine the direction of this influence in general, we have chosen the linear
approach on purpose to focus on the market-entry channel.
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Corruption allows some firms to circumvent the regulation. Without
countermeasures, pollution will go up. The government can offset the effect
by forcing the complying firms to abate more. We have introduced this
intermediate step to contrast the environmentalist view with the welfare
aspect. The optimal reaction of the government is not so obvious when
we take welfare maximization as a government objective and allow for
endogenous market entry.
2.5. Regulation and welfare
Here, we introduce the government’s optimization problem. We focus on a
benevolent government that wants to maximize social welfare. Welfare is
defined as the sum of all profits generated by the firms minus the environ-
mental damages from emissions D (E). It is not straightforward as to how
a benevolent government takes into account bribe payments in its welfare
considerations. If the government is only interested in total rents and does
not care about the distribution of rents or the source of income, bribe pay-
ments will not show up in the welfare function. Here, bribes are simply a
transfer from the non-complying firms to the corrupt officials. The govern-
ment suffers from corruption because it affects entry and environmental
damages but not from the illegal activity per se. However, the govern-
ment may very well care about the distributional dimension. The income
from bribes may be less valuable in terms of welfare than entrepreneurial
income. To allow for both types of welfare functions, we subtract share δ of
bribe income from welfare. For δ = 0, the government shows no distribu-
tional concerns and is interested only in maximizing total rents. For δ = 1,
all illegally received income from corruption is lost in terms of welfare.
Welfare (W ) can be written as
W =
∫ c∗AB
0
1
c̄
(
P − K − c (ē − e)) dc
+
∫ ĉ∗
c∗AB
1
c̄
(
P − K − (1 − ρ)c(ē − e)) dc − D(E) − δ · B, (9)
where B denotes the income from bribes.
B ≡ ρ · b∗ · ĉ
∗
2·c̄ =
ρ·(P − K )2
4·c̄· (1 − ρ2 )2 · (ē − e) .
Note that the income from bribes decreases with tightness of regulation(
ē − e) and increases with the share of corrupt officials ρ. We can rewrite
the welfare in (9) as
W = 1
c̄
{
(P − K )ĉ∗ − ĉ
∗2
2
(
ē − e) [1 − 3ρ
4
]}
− D
(
ĉ∗
c̄
·
{
e + ρ
2
(
ē − e)}) − δ · ρ · ĉ∗2
4·c̄ ·
(
ē − e) (10)
where P − K is the output per firm; the second term captures the abate-
ment costs, the third term describes the environmental damages, and the
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X16000218
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SLUB Dresden, on 15 Apr 2020 at 12:58:11, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
76 Amit Biswas and Marcel Thum
fourth term measures the welfare costs when income flows to corrupt offi-
cials. For didactic purposes, we first analyze the case with fixed market
entry, i.e., with a given ĉ∗, before we turn to the case of endogenous market
entry.
2.5.1. Fixed market entry
Suppose that the government decides on the restrictiveness of the regula-
tion when market-entry decisions have already been made. All firms with
abatement costs c ≤ ĉ∗ have entered the market. Taking the derivative with
respect to the permissible emission level e yields
∂W
∂e
∣∣∣∣
ĉ∗
= 1
c̄
ĉ∗2
2
[
1 − 3ρ
4
]
− D′(E) · ĉ
∗
c̄
·
(
1 − ρ
2
)
+ δ · ρ · ĉ
∗2
4·c̄ = 0 (11)
When distributional issues are irrelevant for welfare (δ = 0), the welfare-
maximizing regulation e∗ is characterized by equalizing marginal abate-
ment costs and marginal environmental damages. If redistribution towards
corrupt officials is considered as detrimental to welfare (δ > 0), a slight
easing of environmental regulation has the additional benefit of reducing
bribe incomes; this effect is captured by the third term in (11). We are now
interested in how optimal regulation changes when corruption increases:
de∗
dρ
∣∣∣∣
ĉ∗
>
<
0 ⇔
∂
(
∂W
∂e
∣∣∣
ĉ∗
)
∂ρ
>
<
0. (12)
Taking the derivative of (11) with respect to ρ and replacing D′(E) with the
first-order condition yields
∂
(
∂W
∂e
∣∣∣
ĉ∗
)
∂ρ
= − ĉ
∗2
4
1 − 2δ
2 − ρ − D
′′ ĉ∗2
2c̄
(
ē − e) (1 − ρ
2
)
. (13)
If distributional concerns are not too strong (δ < 1/2), the government
will tighten the regulations when corruption increases, i.e., expression
(13) is negative.10 The logic is straightforward. If the share of corrupt
officials increases, more firms can circumvent environmental regulations.
For a given number of firms, pollution increases. Therefore, the increase
in the marginal environmental damage makes it optimal for the govern-
ment to choose a lower permissible emission level. Firms adhering to
environmental regulations pay the price of increased corruption.
10 The government’s reaction may be the same for higher values of δ, but we cannot
sign the effect without specifying the environmental damage, D. With high distri-
butional concerns, the government wants to curb bribe payments and, therefore,
might be willing to ease environmental regulation.
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2.5.2. Endogenous market entry
In the next step, we consider that the environmental regulations also affect
the number of firms entering the market. If the government chooses a
more lenient environmental regulation, more firms will enter the mar-
ket
(
∂ ĉ∗
∂e > 0
)
. The welfare-maximizing environmental regulation is now
implicitly given by
∂W
∂e
= 1
c̄
·
{
(P − K ) − ĉ∗ · (ē − e) · (1 − 3
4
ρ
)
− D′(E) ·
(
e + ρ
2
(
ē − e))
− δ · ρ · ĉ
∗
2
· (ē − e)} · ∂ ĉ∗
∂e
+ ∂W
∂e
∣∣∣∣
ĉ∗
= 0. (14)
To understand how the market-entry effect changes the environmental
policy, we analyze the marginal welfare change at the permissible pollu-
tion, e∗, that was optimal for a given market entry for firms (see equation
(11)), as ∂W
∂e
∣∣∣
ĉ∗
= 0 by definition. Because the welfare function (10) is con-
cave in e at the optimum, the sign of the term in curly brackets indicates
whether the entry effect leads to a tougher or more lenient regulatory pol-
icy. If the term in brackets is positive, then a small increase in e will improve
welfare. Substituting D′(E) from the first-order condition (11) and using
ĉ∗ = P−K
(1− ρ2 )(ē−e)
yields (after some simplifications):
∂W
∂e
(
e∗
) = 1
c̄
· P − K
2· (1 − ρ2 )
{
1 − ρ
4
− ē
ē − e ·
1 − 34ρ
1 − ρ2
− δ · ρ
2
·
(
1 + ē
ē − e ·
1
1 − ρ2
) }
· ∂ ĉ
∗
∂e
. (15)
In a world without corruption (ρ = 0), we can clearly sign the entry
effect.
Proposition 2. Without corruption, market entry makes a tighter environmental
regulation optimal (compared to the case without market entry).
Proof : For ρ = 0, equation (15) simplifies to ∂W
∂e
(
e∗
) = 1c̄ · P−K2 {− eē−e } ·
∂ ĉ∗
∂e . Because the term in curly brackets is negative and
∂ ĉ∗
∂e > 0, we obtain
∂W
∂e (e
∗) < 0. At the optimal environmental regulation without entry (e∗),
the marginal effect on welfare is negative. Therefore, having a tighter
regulation is optimal when market entry becomes endogenous. 
The following logic applies for this result: when the government tight-
ens regulations (i.e., lowers e), the marginal firm will leave the market
without having to pay the higher abatement costs. However, without the
exit option, the marginal firm must bear the higher cost. Thus, from the
government’s perspective, the marginal social cost of abatement is lower
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when non-profitable firms can exit. This effect makes it optimal for the
government to choose a tighter regulation in case of endogenous entry.
A similar result has been found in oligopolistic markets. Katsoulacos and
Xepapadeas (1995) show that the optimal tax can exceed the marginal envi-
ronmental damage when market structure is endogenous. Compared to the
case with a fixed number of firms, environmental policy is stricter with
endogenous market entry.11
How does corruption influence this entry effect? We analyze the welfare
effect of a marginal increase of e for ρ > 0. Our reference point is still the
optimal regulation e∗ that would have been chosen with exogenous market
entry.
Proposition 3. With corruption, market entry has an ambiguous effect on opti-
mal environmental regulation (compared to the case of without market entry). For
high levels of corruption, market entry can force the government to choose an even
more lenient environmental policy if distributional issues are a minor concern.
Distributional considerations make the tightening of environmental policy more
likely.
Proof : The inspection of equation (15) immediately indicates that the
curly bracket cannot be signed unambiguously. For ρ → 0, the term in
curly brackets in (15) is negative; the entry effect leads to a tighter regula-
tion. With (a) no distributional concerns (δ = 0), the term in curly brackets is
increasing in ρ : ∂
∂ρ
= 14 ·
(
ē
ē−e · 1(1− ρ2 )2
− 1
)
> 0. Therefore, the term may
become positive for a sufficiently large ρ; the entry effect can lead to a more
lenient regulation when corruption is widespread. (b) Distributional con-
cerns (δ > 0) have a countervailing effect: ∂
∂ρ
= 14 ·
(
ē
(ē−e) ·
1
(1− ρ2 )2
− 1
)
−
δ
2 ·
(
ē
(ē−e) · 1(1− ρ2 )2
+ 1
)
. Strong distributional concerns make it more likely
that the government will tighten the environmental regulation. 
For a better understanding of the mechanism at work, we focus on
the case δ = 0: corruption facilitates the market entry of polluting firms,
thus making a tighter regulation worthwhile. Conversely, an increasing
share of corrupt officials also drives up the bribe rate (see proposition 1),
which leads to an increasing divergence between the expected private
and social costs of market entry. Bribes are private costs, but for δ = 0,
they are pure transfers from non-abating firms to corrupt officials from a
social perspective. With an environmental regulation that equates marginal
abatement costs and marginal environmental damages for a given number
of firms (see equation (11)), entry may be too low from a social perspective.
Therefore, the government may prefer a more lenient policy.
11 Lee (1999) discusses the sensitivity of this result with regard to the curvature of
market demand.
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Proposition 3 demonstrates that the tradeoff for a welfare-maximizing
government may change when corruption is a factor. From an environ-
mental perspective, an increase in corruption should always lead to a
tighter environmental regulation. The situation may be different from a
welfare perspective. Protecting the environment becomes costlier due to
corruption. Corruption drives a wedge between the private and the social
benefits of market entry. Thus, when corruption increases, it becomes opti-
mal for the government to exchange some environmental protection for a
marginally higher market entry.12 This result can be achieved by relaxing
the regulatory requirements.
This mechanism may also help explain why many developing countries
seem to focus more on growth and market entry rather than on envi-
ronmental protection.13 From the perspective of a corruption-free society,
this policy choice might seem suboptimal. However, in a society where
corruption is prevalent, a welfare-maximizing government might find it
worthwhile to relinquish the rather futile efforts of environmental pro-
tection and focus instead on expanding productive (but environmentally
destructive) activities.
3. Possible extensions of the model
We now turn to alternative variants and extensions of the model. First, we
discuss a variant of the model where entry occurs before the decision on
environmental regulation. Then we turn to the question of how our find-
ings are affected when the decision on abatement has to be made before
inspections are made.
3.1. Alternative scenario I: entry before choice of regulation
Suppose that the government decides on the tightness of environmen-
tal regulation after firms have made their entry decision. This alternative
sequence of moves may reflect the long-term nature of market entry and
the ability of the government to react to this market entry. The alternative
sequence of moves is depicted in figure 2.
Because the last two stages are identical to our baseline model, the out-
comes must also be the same. The critical cost where a firm is indifferent
between abatement and bribe is given by (1), and the profit-maximizing
bribe is described by (3). In stage 2, the government maximizes welfare
(9), where environmental quality is defined in (6). The only difference is
that entry ĉ∗ is given for the government and is no longer a function
of environmental regulation. Taking the derivative of (9) with regard to
12 A similar effect is at work in Damania et al. (2003). They analyze the effect of
corruption on a pollution tax. Bribes induce the (non-benevolent) government to
shift its focus from social welfare to firm profits. The lower weight on welfare
leads to a more lenient environmental policy.
13 Another and quantitatively more important channel is certainly the income effect.
Poorer countries will simply value environmental quality less than richer societies
do.
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Figure 2. Sequence of moves in Alternative scenario I
environmental regulation e yields, after some simplifications,
∂W
∂e
= 1
c̄
ĉ∗2
2
[
1 − 3ρ
4
]
− D′(E) · ĉ
∗
c̄
·
(
1 − ρ
2
)
+ δ · ρ · ĉ
∗
4·c̄ = 0. (11
′)
Comparison of (11) and (11′) shows that the government chooses the
same level of environmental regulation whether the firms decide on entry
before or after regulation. Hence, what matters for our key results is that
firms have a choice of entry but not the timing of choices. This neutrality
result is clearly due to the atomistic firms and the uniform distribution of
costs. Things would be different if firms could behave strategically, e.g., by
investing at different levels.
3.2. Alternative scenario II: abatement decision before inspection
What happens when the firms have to make their abatement decision
before any inspection takes place? In the baseline model, firms operated
with abatement when monitored by an honest official and circumvented
the regulation when cooperating with a corrupt official. Therefore, firms
could adjust their abatement according to the orders of the supervisory
agency. An alternative view is that firms make an abatement choice before
any inspection takes place. This could be particularly relevant when firms
make long-term technology choices when entering a market. Therefore, we
assume in the following time sequence (see figure 3) that firms simultane-
ously decide on entry and abatement before the administration inspects the
production site. A corrupt official who inspects a non-compliant firm will
ask for a bribe. Non-compliant firms that are not willing to pay the bribe or
that are monitored by honest officials are closed down; i.e., firms exit the
market again.
We briefly sketch the solution of this game. As the government’s degree
of control is crucial here, we assume that only a fraction γ of firms is mon-
itored at all.14 In stage 4, all non-compliant firms that are monitored by
corrupt officials compare bribe b with benefit P of staying in the market.
Hence, corrupt officials will extract all rents from these firms by charg-
ing b = P in stage 3. In stage 2, each firm has three options: stay out of
the market, or enter with abatement (e) or without abatement (ē). Enter-
ing with compliant abatement yields a profit of EπA = P − c ·
(
ē − e) − K ;
the firm earns a revenue of P but has to shoulder abatement and entry
costs. Because the firm violates no regulations, neither the probability of
inspection nor the share of corrupt officials matters for the determina-
tion of profits. For firms that do not comply, the expected profit amounts
14 In the baseline model, we set γ = 1 for notational convenience.
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Figure 3. Sequence of moves in Alternative scenario II
to Eπ0 = (1 − γ ) · P + γ · [ρ · 0 + (1 − ρ) · 0] − K = (1 − γ ) · P − K . With
probability (1 − γ ), firms are not inspected at all and earn P . Net earnings
become zero. If the official is honest, the firm is forced to close down; if
the official is corrupt, the entire revenue is transferred via bribe payments
to the corrupt official. To focus on the interesting case, we assume that
(1 − γ ) · P − K > 0; i.e., the monitoring rate is sufficiently low that firms
consider entering without sufficient abatement.15 Comparison of EπA and
Eπ0 immediately shows that all firms with abatement costs c ≤ γ ·P(ē−e) pre-
fer entering with a compliant strategy; all other firms take the risk of being
detected and of having to exit the market. Obviously, corruption has no
effect on entry in this scenario because corrupt and honest officials generate
the same net revenue for detected firms. Of course, corruption is not neu-
tral with regard to the distribution of rents or the level of total emissions.
Whereas honest officials force non-compliant firms to exit the market, cor-
rupt officials allow firms to continue production with high emissions.16
If firms have to decide on abatement before being monitored, there is no
feedback effect of corruption on market entry. Hence, the tradeoff between
environmental quality and entry vanishes in this case.
4. Conclusion
We have developed a simple model to study the welfare-maximizing envi-
ronmental regulation when market entry is endogenous and when firms
can circumvent regulation by bribing corrupt officials. Corruption changes
the tradeoff in environmental policy. Corruption leads a greater number of
polluting firms to enter the market, which suggests a tighter environmental
regulation. Conversely, corruption also makes it optimal for the govern-
ment to exchange some environmental protection for a marginally higher
market entry. This study also highlights the differences between the envi-
ronmentalist view and the welfare perspective. From an environmental
perspective, regulations must become tighter when corruption compro-
mises the emission objectives. The law-abiding firms must meet higher
environmental standards to compensate for the environmental damages
caused by those firms that circumvent the regulation with the help of cor-
rupt officials. From a welfare perspective, corruption increases the costs
of environmental protection. Therefore, exchanging some environmental
15 In the alternative case, firms compare entering with compliant abatement and not
entering at all. Therefore, corruption plays no role at all.
16 Total emissions amount to E = 1c̄ ·
[
γ ·P
(ē−e) · e + (1 − γ + γρ) ·
(
c̄ − γ ·P
(ē−e)
)
· ē
]
.
Hence, total emissions increase with the share of corrupt officials.
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protection for market entry can be optimal. In other words, low environ-
mental standards may not only be the outcome of a political process where
interest groups and self-serving politicians take precedence over the public
interest. Low environmental standards can also be a welfare-maximizing
choice when the administrative monitoring of environmental standards is
characterized by corruption.
Our model is admittedly simple, and several extensions are conceiv-
able. First, one may want to generalize the distribution of abatement costs.
Deviating from the assumption of a uniform distribution would introduce
an additional mechanism for determining how corruption affects the allo-
cation of abating and polluting firms. Secondly, we could introduce an
informal or shadow economy parallel to the registered firms. In the present
model, firms are registered but hide the actual emission amounts by bribing
the monitors. In an alternative scenario, the shadow economy could serve
as a costly exit option where polluting firms escape both the government
regulation and the corrupt bureaucracy.
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